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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
--------------------------
LOGAN CITY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
ROBERT KELLY BASSETT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
16320 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment in a criminal 
case by the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court denied appellant's motion to 
dismiss an appeal filed by the respondent, Logan City, 
concerning a charge of driving with a blood-alcohol 
content of .10% or higher. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant requests this Court to reverse 
the uccision of the lower court and dismiss the criminal 
cl1argc against the appellant. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
By a single Complaint signed January 30, 1978, 
the appellant was charged with having committed 
criminal offenses on January 25, 1978 of driving with 
a blood-alcohol content of .10% or higher, driving a 
motor vehicle through a red stop light, and being a 
person under the age of twenty-one years in possession 
of alcoholic beverages. (ROll 
The matters were set for trial on April 12, 1978. 
At the start of the trial Count 2 and 3, the red light 
violation and illegal possession of alcohol violation 
respective~y, were dismissed on motion of Logan City. 
The~ ~~e p~ospective jurors were sworn and voir dired. 
A ~ury was selected and sworn to try the case. (R9) 
Appellant's counsel then moved the Court to 
dismiss Count 1, the charge of driving with a blood 
alcohol content of .10% or higher, pursuant to 
76-1-402 and 403, Utah Code Annotated. This motion 
was granted by the Logan City Judge, the Honorable 
Zachary T. Champlin. (RlO) 
On April 17, 1978, Logan City appealed Judge 
Champlin's decision to the District Court of the First 
Judicial District in and for the County of Cache, 
contending that the City Court erroneously interpreted 
and applied the Single Criminal Episode Statutes, 
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76-1-402 and 403, Utah Code Annotated. (R6) 
The appellant filed a Motion to dismiss 
respondent's appeal, contending that the Notice of 
Appeal had not personally been served upon the 
appellant or his counsel. This Motion was denied 
by Memorandum Decision of Judge VeNoy Christoffersen 
on June 16, 1978. ( Rl2, 20) 
Appellant then filed a Motion to dismiss the 
Complaint pursuant to the Single Criminal Episode 
Statutes. (R25-27) 
By Memorandum Decision dated August 21, 1978, 
Judge VeNoy Christoffersen denied appellant's Motion 
to dismiss the appeal. (R33) 
Immediately after this Memorandum Decision, 
appellant filed a Motion to dismiss the Complaint, 
contending that 77-51-6, Utah Code Annotated, constituted 
a bar to any further prosecution of the appellant. (R35) 
By Memorandum Decision dated September 19, 1978, 
Judge Christoffersen declined to rule on that issue and 
remanded the matter back to Logan City Court which had 
by this time become the Logan Department of the Circuit 
Cou:t L. (R37) 
Appellant then filed his Motion to dismiss the 
Complaint in the Logan Department of the Circuit Court. 
It w~s denied by the Honorable Zachary T. Champlin by 
-3-
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Memorandum Decision dated November 20, 1978. (R46) 
Appellant filed an appeal to the Cache County 
District Court, still contending that 77-51-6, Utah 
Code Annotated, prohibited further prosecution of the 
offense of driving with a blood-alcohol content of 
.10% or higher. By Memorandum Decision dated 
February 8, 1979, the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen 
denied appellant's motions and appeal. (R58) 
ARGUMENT 
THE APPELLANT SHOULD NOT BE PROSECUTED AGAIN FOR THE 
SAME MISDEMENJOR AFTER IT HAS ONCE BEEN DISMISSED. 
:r. Ap~il 12, 1978, after a jury had been 
selecL~d ~nd sworn to try appellant's case, his 
counsel moved to dismiss the charge of driving with 
a blood-alcohol content of .10% or higher, which 
motion was granted by the Logan City Judge. Logan 
City filed an appeal and the Honorable VeNoy 
Christoffersen ruled that the Logan City Judge had 
errored in dismissing the criminal charge against 
the appellant. 
Logan City then attempted to re-prosecute 
the appellant on that charge. 
In opposition, appellant relies on 77-51-6, 
Utah Code Annotated, which states: 
-4-
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An order for the dismissal of an 
action as provided in this chapter 
shall be a bar to any other 
prosecution for the same offense, 
if it is a misdemeanor; but shall 
not be a bar, if the offense is a 
felony. 
In Boyer v. Larson, 433 P. 2d 1015, the. 
defendant had been convicted in City Court of a 
misdemeanor which he appealed to the District Court. 
The District Court inadvertantly dismissed the 
defendant's case before it ever came to trial. The 
defendant cited 77-51-6, Utah Code Annotated, as 
authority for preventing further prosecution. In 
Boyer, this Court held that 77-51-6, Utah Code 
Annotated, did not apply to that fact situation sine~ 
the dismissal of the misdemeanor occurred before the 
trial of the matter had actually started. Therefore, 
it was not "other prosecution for the same offense". 
In the appellant's case, the dismissal occurred 
after the jury had been sworn to try the case and the 
appellant urges that reverse reasoning of Boyer would 
place his case within the purview of 77-51-6, Utah Code 
Annotated, and prohibit additional prosecution. 
The respondent contends that the dismissal 
referred to in 77-51-6, Utah Code Annotated, is only a 
dismissal that comes about pursuant to 77-51-4, Utah 
Code Annotated, which states: 
-5-
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The court may, either of its own 
motion or upon the application of 
the county attorney, in furtherance 
of justice order an action, 
information or indictment to be 
dismissed. The reasons for the 
dismissal must be set forth in an 
order entered upon the minutes. 
However, Chapter 51 of Title 77 refers to 
other types of dismissals and 77-51-3, Utah Code 
Annotated, provides: 
which is 
If the court directs the action 
to be dismissed, the defendant 
must, if in custody, be discharged 
therefrom; or if admitted to bail, 
his bail shall be exonerated, or 
money deposited instead of bail 
must be refunded to him. 
cc~ell~nt contends that section four 
Qismissal in the furtherance of justice 
a subjective standard by the trial judge 
and would apply to appellant's case. Section three 
would also include a dismissal made at the direction 
of the Court, but in response to a proper motion by 
the defendant. 
If the respondent's logic is to be followed 
to its conclusion, the City or State would be free 
to appeal, and if successful, re-try any misdemeanor 
that was dismissed upon motion of a defense attorney 
during the course of a trial. This is obviously 
ridiculous and would also fly in the face of the 
-6-
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prohibition against double jeopardy. 
In State v. Lewis, 536 P. 2d 738 (1975), 
the defendants Lewis and Robinson were both accused 
of kidnapping and rape. At the conclusion of the 
prosecution's case, the defense moved for a dismissal 
of both counts against both defendants which was 
granted by the Court. The prosecution appealed the 
trial court's ruling. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme 
Court held that the trial judge had erroneously 
dismissed the charge, but that the double jeopardy 
provision of the Idaho Constitution would prevent 
the re-trial of the defendants on those charges. 
Idaho's double jeopardy provision is identical to 
Utah's as well as the Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States. 
In Lewis, the Court referred to the Idaho 
Rules of Criminal Procedure which is similar to 
77-51-6, Utah Code Annotated, except it includes a 
dismissal upon motion of the defendant. 
Utah's Code of Criminal Procedure is silent 
upon the defendant's right to move for dismissal if 
the facts or law warrant. Obviously, a defendant has 
this right, and when such a motion is granted the Lewis 
rule should apply and prohibit re-trial even if the 
trial court errored. 
-7-
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Appellant is not conceding that Judge 
Champlin errored in dismissing the criminal charge, 
but has chosen not to use this forum to request an 
interpretation of the Single Criminal Episode 
Statutes. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent should be prohibited from 
re-prosecuting the appellant and the original 
dismissal of the Complaint in City Court should 
stand. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HUTCHISON 
Attorney for Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid~ 
to J. Blaine Zollinger, Attorney for Respondent, 
256 North 100 West, Logan, UT 84321, and two copies to 
Robert B. Hansen, Utah State Attorney General, 236 State 
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, on this 29th 
day of March, 1979. 
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